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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)G).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.

Did the trial court err in denying the Motion for Summary Judgment of plaintiff

Premier Van Schaack Realty, Inc. ("Premier") seeking an award of its contractual
brokerage fee, prejudgment interest and attorneys' fees and, in turn, granting summary
judgment in favor of defendant Thomas K. Sieg ("Sieg") by concluding that Sieg's
conveyance of a historic mansion to MJTM, LLC, a Utah limited liability company
("MJTM"), on January 21, 1998 within the term of the Sieg's exclusive listing agreement
with Premier, and the resulting benefits Sieg received from MJTM, did not constitute
consideration for Sieg's obligation to pay Premier's contractual brokerage fee?
A trial court's summary judgment rulings are reviewed for correctness. Surety
Underwriters v. E & C Trucking, Inc., 2000 UT 71, f 14, 10 P.3d 338. Also, this issue
concerns the interpretation of a statute, which the appellate court reviews for correctness.
See State v. Powasnik, 918 P.2d 146, 148 (Utah App. 1996) ("A trial court's
interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review for correctness.").
This issue was preserved in the trial court by Premier's Motion for Summary
Judgment, Premier's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, and
Premier's Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment that raised
this precise issue. R. at 53; 56; 264.

413810.1

II.

Did the trial court err in awarding Sieg attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of

$23,242.77, and denying Premier's request for an award of its reasonable attorneys' fees
and costs incurred in this action?
A trial court's determination that attorneys' fees and costs are recoverable is
reviewed for correctness. Softsolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young University, 2000 UT 46,
1 12, 1 P.3d 1095; see also Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, f 76, 5 P.3d 616. A trial court's
determination of what constitutes reasonable fees and costs is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Softsolutions, 2000 UT 46, If 12; see also Lyon, 2000 UT 19, f 76.
This issue was preserved in the trial court by Premier's Motion for Summary
Judgment, Premier's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, and
Premier's Objection to Defendant's Affidavit of Attorneys Fees that raised this precise
issue. R. at 53; 56; 340.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-105(l) - full text included in the Addendum.
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b -109(1):
(1) Except as otherwise specifically set forth in this chapter,
neither the members, the managers, nor the employees of a limited
liability company are personally liable under a judgment, decree,
or order of a court, or in any other manner, for a debt, obligation,
or liability of the limited liability company.
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b -112:
A member of a limited liability company is not a proper party to
proceedings by or against a limited liability company, except when
the object is to enforce a member's right against, or liability to, the
limited liability company.

Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b -127(1):
(1) Real or personal property owned or purchased by a limited
liability company may be held and owned, and conveyance shall
be made, in the name of the limited liability company.
Utah Code Ann. §15-1-1(2):
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of
interest, the legal rate of interest for the loan or forebearance of
any money, goods, or chose in action shall be 10% per annum.
Utah Code of Judicial Admin., Rule 4-505(1):
(1) Affidavits in support of an award of attorney fees must be filed
with the court and set forth specifically the legal basis for the
award, the nature of the work performed by the attorney, the
number of hours spent to prosecute the claim to judgment, or the
time spent in pursuing the matter to the stage for which attorney
fees are claimed, and affirm the reasonableness of the fees for
comparable legal services.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This dispute is about the failure to pay a brokerage fee for a transaction involving
the conveyance of real property located at 273 N. East Capital, Salt Lake City, Utah (the
"Property"). Sieg was the owner of the Property. On February 7, 1997, Sieg entered into
a twelve-month exclusive listing agreement with Coldwell Banker Premier, the
predecessor-in-interest to Premier, to sell the Property (the "Listing").

The Listing

provided for payment of a 7% commission if, during the term of the Listing, Premier or
anyone else located a party ready, willing and able to buy, lease or exchange the Property
at terms agreeable to the owner.
On March 13, 1997, working through a Premier agent, Michael G. Davis
("Davis"), Marion C. Vaughn ("Vaughn") and Jane E. Johnson ("Johnson") submitted to

Sieg a real estate purchase contract, offering to purchase the Property for $1.3 million
(Johnson never signed the real estate purchase contract). Although Sieg, Davis, Vaughn
and Johnson negotiated and entered into a binding real estate purchase contract and
several extensions, Davis, Vaughn and Johnson never completed their purchase of the
Property. Instead, on September 26, 1997, Sieg, Davis, Vaughn and Johnson formed a
Utah limited liability company, MJTM, LLC, to own the Property and convert it into a
"Bed and Breakfast," when they signed the MJTM, LLC Operating Agreement (the
"Operating Agreement").
On January 21, 1998, Sieg transferred the Property to MJTM by warranty deed
that was recorded in the Salt Lake County real property records that same day. In
exchange, in the Operating Agreement, MJTM agreed to assume $580,000 in debt owed
by Sieg, and Sieg received a 40% interest in MJTM, an initial balance in his capital
contribution account of $670,000 and a priority 9% return on his initial capital
contribution. Further, effectively simultaneously with Sieg's conveyance of the Property
to MJTM, on January 14, 1998, MJTM borrowed $1,413 million dollars from Zions First
National Bank ("Zions"), part of which was used to pay off $300,000 in debt owed by
Sieg and the remainder was used to develop the Property. Davis, Vaughn, Johnson and
Sieg each signed guaranty agreements for the loan from Zions.
Ultimately, the involvement of the other members of MJTM, and particularly
Vaughn and Johnson, did not work out as Sieg had anticipated. On February 18, 1999,
Sieg purchased the interests of Vaughn and Johnson in MJTM for $30,000 each, as part
of a transaction to sell the Property to Karl Malone, and made separate settlement with

Davis. Nonetheless, it is undisputed that MJTM acquired the Property from Sieg on
January 21, 1998, for his interest in MJTM and the other benefits he received as provided
in the Operating Agreement, during the term of the Listing. Based on the unambiguous
provisions of the Listing, Premier is entitled to a 7% commission based on the exchange,
plus $250.00, plus prejudgment interest, Premier's costs and attorneys' fees.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

Premier moved for summary judgment on its claims asserted in the complaint for
breach of the Listing agreement between Sieg and Premier. R. at 53. Premier argued
that, because Sieg conveyed the Property to MJTM during the term of the Listing for
agreed consideration, Premier is entitled to the brokerage fee, and other amounts
provided in the Listing. R. at 62-67. Sieg cross-moved for summary judgment on
Premier's claims. R. at 233. The briefing on the cross-motions demonstrates that there
are no disputed issues of fact, only disputes over legal conclusions arising from the
undisputed facts. R. at 58-61; 236-39; 266-67; 290-92. Sieg argued that his transfer of
title to the Property to MJTM "never rose to the level of a purchase, sale, exchange, or
acquisition as contemplated in the Listing Agreement." R. at 239. Premier disputed this
assertion as well as Sieg's assertion that he received no compensation in return for the
conveyance, or relief of any debt. R. at 266-67. Premier also moved the court to strike
the portions of the Sieg Affidavit and the Affidavit of Michael G. Davis ("Davis") in
which they assert that Sieg received nothing in exchange for his transfer of the Property
to MJTM, given that those assertions contradict the unambiguous terms of the MJTM

Operating Agreement, which states the benefits Sieg received in exchange for his transfer
of the Property. R. at 279-80; 283-85.
C.

Disposition Below.

In an Order dated December 6, 2000, as supplemented by its Minute Entry dated
December 7, 2000, the district court denied Premier's motion for summary judgment, and
granted Sieg's cross-motion for summary judgment. R. at 382-83; 385. The district
court denied Premier's motion to strike portions of the affidavits of Sieg and Davis (as
well as portions of the affidavit of Victor R. Ayers). R. at 383. Also, the district court
awarded Sieg attorneys' fees in the amount of $23,242.77. R. at 383; 385.
D.

Statement of Facts.

The undisputed material facts are as follows:
1.

In 1992, Sieg purchased the Property from the Zitos. R. at 71. After

his purchase, Sieg upgraded the Property with new landscaping, roofing, parking and
driveways. Id.
2.

Sieg signed a Listing Agreement and Agency Disclosure on February

7, 1997 (the "Listing") listing the Property for sale with Coldwell Banker Premier Realty
("Coldwell") for a period from February 7,1997 to February 15, 1998. R. at 72-73; 109-10.
The Listing granted to Coldwell "the Exclusive Right to Sell, Lease, or Exchange" the
Property during the term of the Listing. R. at 109, ^f 1. The Listing provided:
If, during the Listing period, Coldwell Banker Premier
Realty, the Listing Agent, the Owner, another real estate
agent, or anyone else locates a party who is ready, willing and
able to buy, lease, or exchange (collectively referred to as
"acquire") the Property, or any part thereof, at the listing

price and terms stated on the attached board/association
property data information form, or any other price or terms to
which the Owner may agree in writing, the Owner agrees to
pay to Coldwell Banker Premier Realty a brokerage fee in the
amount of seven percent (7%) of such acquisition price; in
addition, there will be a two hundred fifty dollar ($250.00)
charge at the time of closing. The brokerage fee, unless
otherwise agreed in writing by the Owner and Coldwell
banker [sic] Premier Realty, shall be due and payable on the
date of closing of the acquisition of the Property.
R. at 109, f 2; see also R. at 74-75.
3.

Paragraph 8 of the Listing provided:

ATTORNEYS FEES. Except as provided in section 7, in
case of the employment of an attorney in any matter arising
out of this Listing Agreement (including a sale of the
Property) the prevailing party shall be entitled to receive from
the other party all costs and reasonable attorney's fees,
whether the matter is resolved through court action or
otherwise.
R. at 1 1 0 4 8 .
4.

On about March 13, 1997, Rick Nosseir ("Nosseir"), a Coldwell agent,

introduced Davis, Vaughn and Johnson to Sieg as prospective purchasers of the Property.
R. at 76-77. Sieg was presented a real estate purchase contract signed by Davis and Vaughn
stating that Davis, Vaughn and Johnson offered to purchase the Property for $1.3 million.
R. at 76-78; 112-13. Sieg made a counteroffer that was accepted by Davis and Vaughn
(with the proviso that Sieg would grant reasonable extensions of certain deadlines, if
necessary) (the "DVJ Purchase Contract"). R. at 79-81; 114.

5.

The parties extended the DVJ Purchase Contract several times. R. at

82-84; 115-16. The anticipated sale to the proposed purchasers individually never closed,
and the proposed purchasers received their earnest money back. R. at 90.
6.

By June 1997, Davis, Vaughn and Johnson proposed through their

attorney, Robert N. Wilkinson, modifications to their proposed purchase of the Property,
including that the purchaser of the Property would be a Utah limited liability company, and
that Sieg would receive a 40% interest in the limited liability company for a portion of the
purchase price, and would receive a preferential return from the limited liability company.
R. at 85-89; 119-21.

Sieg discussed the proposal with the proposed purchasers, and

although there was nothing reduced to writing and signed by Sieg during this time frame,
Sieg generally went along with the proposal. R. at 87.
7.

On September 26, 1997, Sieg, Davis, Vaughn and Johnson formed a

Utah limited liability company, MJTM when they signed the Operating Agreement.1 R. at
91-92; 122; 170-72. In the Operating Agreement it provided that Sieg would transfer the
Property to MJTM as his contribution to MJTM, and that he would receive a 40% interest in
MJTM. R. at 93-95; 130-31; 173. In the Operating Agreement, in discussing Sieg's
contribution of the Property to MJTM, it provided that the agreed value of the Property was
"$1,300,000.00, which represents the fair market value of such [P]roperty as of the date [of
the Operating Agreement], less the sum of $280,000 encumbering such [Property, and the
sum of $300,000 representing additional liabilities of Tom Sieg incurred in the acquisition

1

MJTM was named after its members, Marion Vaughn, Jane Johnson, Tom Sieg,
and Michael G. Davis. R. at 173.

or development of such [P]roperty, and which the Company [MJTM] shall assume." R. at
173; see also R. at 93-94. The Operating Agreement provided that the beginning balance in
Sieg's initial capital contribution account equaled $670,000. R. at 173. Also, the Operating
Agreement provided that Sieg was to receive a priority return from MJTM of 9% on Sieg's
initial capital contribution as long as it was not repaid. R. at 95; 128; 138.
8.

On or about January 14, 1998, approximately contemporaneously with

Sieg's conveyance of the Property to MJTM, MJTM borrowed $1,413 million from Zions
First National Bank secured with a lien on the Property. R. at 186-89; 190-97. The loan
was advanced to MJTM in increments pursuant to a construction loan agreement. R. at 100;
179-85. The loan was used to finance the remodeling of the Property into a "Bed and
Breakfast," to implement the principal purpose of MJTM expressed in the Operating
Agreement "to engage in the renovation and operation of a first rate bad and breakfast
luxury inn." R. at 130. Also, to implement the terms of the Operating Agreement that
provided that MJTM would assume the debt encumbering the Property in connection with
Sieg's conveyance of the Property to MJTM, loan proceeds were used to pay off the
$300,000 loan in Sieg's name secured by a lien on the Property, approximately
contemporaneously with Sieg's conveyance of the Property to MJTM. R. at 101-02.
9.

On January 21, 1998, within the one-year term of the Listing, Sieg

conveyed the Property to MJTM by warranty deed that was recorded in the Salt Lake
County real property records that same day. R. at 96-97; 174.
10.

In December 1998, Diana Kirk of Zions First National Bank set up a

meeting between Sieg and Karl Malone ("Malone") regarding the Property. R. at 107.

Malone agreed to purchase a 50% interest in the Property initially, and agreed to purchase
the remainder over time. R. at 107-08. In connection with his purchase, Malone provided
that he would buy out Vaughn and Johnson, and would keep Davis on as general manager
until the completion of construction on the Property. R. at 103-04. MJTM conveyed the
Property to Sieg in connection with this transaction on February 8, 1999. R. at 104-05; 218.
MJTM had owned the Property for over one year, and the renovation of the Property was
"[p]retty much complete." R. at 107-08. MJTM was dissolved on February 9, 1999. R. at
106; 219.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
It is undisputed that, pursuant to the Listing, Sieg was obligated to pay Premier's
brokerage fee in the event the Property was sold, leased or exchanged during the term of
the Listing. Accordingly, the two primary dispositive issues in this dispute are whether
Sieg's conveyance of the Property to MJTM involved valid consideration to Sieg, and
whether Sieg's conveyance of the Property to MJTM therefore constituted a sale or
exchange under the terms of the Listing.
The trial court erred in concluding that Sieg's conveyance of the Property to
MJTM and his resulting obligation to pay Premier's brokerage fee failed for lack of
consideration. First, MJTM's agreed assumption of $580,000 of debts owed by Sieg as
provided in the Operating Agreement was an undeniable benefit to Sieg and constituted
valid consideration. MJTM became liable to Sieg for any amount Sieg would have to pay
on the assumed debts. Also, implementing the Operating Agreement, MJTM actually
paid $300,000 owed by Sieg from funds borrowed by MJTM from Zions First National

Bank effectively contemporaneously with Sieg's conveyance of the Property to MJTM.
Further, although Sieg signed a personal guaranty of the Zions debt to MJTM, so did
Davis, Vaughn and Johnson. MJTM was primarily liable to Zions and Sieg was only
secondarily liable to Zions along with Davis, Vaughn and Johnson.
Further, Sieg's interests in MJTM and his agreed preferential return constituted
valid consideration. Although MJTM was a new entity, and made no express promise to
reach profitability, the law implies a promise to obtain profitability insofar as necessary
to prevent a contract from being illusory and unenforceable for lack of consideration.
Sieg asked for and received something that he would not otherwise be entitled to from
MJTM. It did not matter that the benefits received by Sieg may or may not have proved
to be of much value based on the success of MJTM in the future, or lack thereof. The
benefits received constituted valid consideration.
MJTM was a separate legal entity from Sieg, both by statute and the common law
in Utah. The conveyance by Sieg to MJTM for valid consideration constituted a sale.
MJTM owned the Property for over one year and "pretty much" completed the
renovation of the Property.
The fact that Sieg's dealings with MJTM did not work out exactly as anticipated
did not alter Sieg's obligation to pay Premier its brokerage fee. Premier was not an
insurer of Sieg's involvement with MJTM. Rather, when Sieg conveyed the Property to
MJTM for the agreed and valid consideration, Sieg became obligated to pay Premier's
brokerage fee regardless of MJTM's later success or failure.

It is undisputed that the value of the Property, as agreed in the Operating
Agreement was $1.3 million. Accordingly, Premier is entitled to judgment in its favor
for $91,000, or 7% of $1.3 million, plus $250, as provided in the Listing. Premier is also
entitled to prejudgment interest given that the amount of Premier's brokerage fee was
mathematically certain and fixed as of the date Sieg conveyed the Property to MJTM.
Further, as the prevailing party, Premier is entitled to its reasonable attorneys' fees and
costs, to be determined by the district court on remand.
This Court should reverse the ruling of the district court, and should remand to the
district court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Premier for $91,250, plus
prejudgment interest, plus reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, in an amount to be
determined by the district court.
ARGUMENT
In the complaint, Premier alleges that Sieg breached the Listing when he conveyed
title to the Property to MJTM without paying the promised 7% brokerage commission
plus $250.00. Sieg's obligations under the Listing are governed by contract principles.
A basic rule of contract interpretation is that the determination of a contract's meaning
and legal affect are questions of law for determination by the court.

Faulkner v.

Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 1149, 1150 (Utah 1986); Wade v. Stangl, 869 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah
App. 1994). The intent of the parties is determined from the language in the contract
itself and, in the absence of ambiguity, the contract must be construed and understood in
its plain, ordinary and proper sense, according to the meaning derived from the plain

wording of the contract. Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773
P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989).
In this case, Sieg entered into an exclusive listing agreement with Premier. R. at
109, THJ 1 and 2. This type of real estate listing "has been universally upheld." Chumney
v. Stott, 381 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1963). The type of transaction that will entitle a broker to
its commission is determined by the intent of the parties as shown in the listing
agreement. Gump & Ayers Real Estate, Inc. v. Domcoy Investors, 733 P.2d 128, 130
(Utah 1987); see also Kahler, Inc. v. Weiss, 539 N.W.2d 86, 90 (S.D. 1995) (listing
agreement provided for payment of commission on sale which included exchange or
trade, and court found that an exchange or trade was made as a matter of law). Like the
listing agreement in the Domcoy Investors case, the Listing provided "for the payment of
a [seven] percent commission, irrespective of whether the [PJroperty [was] sold, leased,
or exchanged by plaintiffs, defendants, or any other party during the contract period."
Domcoy Investors, 733 P.2d at 130. The Listing provided that Premier was entitled to its
commission once a party was located who was "ready, willing and able to buy, lease, or
exchange (collectively referred to as 'acquire') the Property, or any part thereof, at... any
other price or terms to which the Owner may agree in writing ...." R. at 109, % 1.
Sieg does not dispute that he was obligated to pay Premier the agreed brokerage
fee if the Property had been sold, leased or exchanged during the term of the Listing for
consideration. It is undisputed that Sieg conveyed title to the Property to MJTM during
the term of the Listing. Accordingly, the resolution of this dispute turns on whether the

conveyance to MJTM was for consideration and whether the conveyance was a sale,
lease or exchange under the Listing.
On December 6, 2000, the district court signed the Order in which the court denied
Plaintiff Premier Van Schaack Realty, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment and its
Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavits of Michael G. Davis, Thomas K. Sieg and Victor
R. Ayers, and granted Defendant Thomas K. Sieg's Motion for Summary Judgment. R.
at 382-83.

The court gave as its reason for granting Sieg's Motion for Summary

Judgment the court's conclusion that there was lack of consideration.

R. at 383.

Nonetheless, the court erred in concluding that Sieg's conveyance of the Property to
MJTM lacked consideration to support Sieg's contractual obligation to pay Premier's
brokerage fee as provided in the Listing.
Sieg received consideration from MJTM for his conveyance to MJTM of the
Property. Also, the conveyance to MJTM was a conveyance to a separate entity, which
constituted a sale or exchange, entitling Premier to its agreed brokerage fee. This Court
should reverse the ruling of the district court, and remand with instructions to the district
court to enter judgment in favor of Premier for its brokerage fee in the amount of
$91,250, plus prejudgment interest at 10% per annum from January 21, 1998 to the date
of judgment, plus Premier's reasonable costs and attorneys' fees, including attorneys'
fees on appeal.

L

SIEG RECEIVED CONSIDERATION FOR HIS CONVEYANCE OF THE
PROPERTY TO MJTM.
In the district court, as well as on appeal in connection with Sieg's Motion for

Summary Affirmance, Sieg argued that he is not obligated to pay the agreed brokerage
commission provided for in the exclusive listing agreement with Premier because there
was a lack of consideration for Sieg's transfer of the Property to MJTM. See, e.g., R. at
295-301. The district court gave as its reason for granting Sieg's Motion for Summary
Judgment the court's conclusion that there was lack of consideration. R. at 383.
Sieg received in exchange for his transfer of the Property to MJTM (1) an
agreement by MJTM to assume $580,000 in liabilities owed by Sieg, which was
implemented in part when MJTM paid off $300,000 in liabilities owed by Sieg with
proceeds of the loan MJTM obtained from Zions First National Bank at the time Sieg
conveyed the Property to MJTM, (2) an initial balance in his MJTM capital account of
$670,000, (3) a 40% interest in MJTM, and (4) a promised 9% priority return on his
initial capital contribution. As a matter of law, these benefits constituted consideration
for the conveyance of the Property by Sieg to MJTM.
"Sufficiency of consideration is not necessarily measured in terms of money value
equivalents. If one party asks for and receives something which he would not otherwise
be entitled to from the other, that is adequate consideration." Gorgoza v. Utah State Road
Comm'n, 553 P.2d 413, 416 (Utah 1976). "It matters not that this may or may not have
proved to be of much actual value." Id.

MJTM's assumption and payment of Sieg's debt constituted consideration beyond
any dispute. Not only did MJTM agree in the MJTM Operating Agreement to assume
$580,000 in debts owed by Sieg, but in implementing the Operating Agreement, MJTM
actually paid off $300,000 of those debts with proceeds from the loan MJTM received
from Zions First National Bank at the time Sieg conveyed the Property to MJTM. There
is no question that Sieg bargained for MJTM to assume $580,000 in debts he owed, and
that he received not only assumption of debt, which he was not otherwise entitled to, but
also immediate payment by MJTM of $300,000 of the assumed debt.
In the one reported case in which a court addressed the obligation of an individual
to pay a brokerage fee upon conveying property subject to an exclusive listing to a
limited liability company of which the individual was a member, the court discussed the
two primary issues relevant to resolution of this dispute. 55ee Hagan v. Adams Prop.
Assocs., 253 Va. 217, 482 S.E. 2d 805 (Va. 1997) (a copy of the Hagan case is included
in the Addendum for the Court's convenience). In an attempt to avoid paying the agreed
brokerage fee, the individual argued that his transfer to the limited liability company "did
not constitute a sale because he did not receive any present valuable consideration for his
contribution." Id. at 219, 482 S.E.2d at 807. Like Sieg, the individual argued that,
"while his contribution determined what share of the ownership of the company he was
entitled to receive, a new business such as [the limited liability company] 'involves an
expectation of future profits and is always speculative.9" Id.
The Hagan court rejected this argument. The court pointed out that, like in this
case, the limited liability company agreed to assume all liabilities existing on the

property, including the balance owing on the first deed of trust note. Id. The court
stated:
The record does not indicate whether the holder of the first
deed of trust note released [the individual] and substituted
[the limited liability company] as the obligor on the note.
Even assuming such substitution did not occur, [the
individual] nevertheless received substantial relief from his
debt obligation because, upon assuming all liabilities on the
property, [the limited liability company] became liable to [the
individual] for any amount [the individual] would have had to
pay the holder of the first deed of trust note.
Id. The Hagan court concluded that the limited liability company's assumption of debt,
combined with a secured right to a preferential payment on sale of the property (like the
agreed preferential return Sieg received in this case) and the interest the individual
received in the limited liability company, constituted valid consideration. Id. at 219-20,
482 S.E.2d at 807.
Likewise, in this case, the record does not reflect whether the holders of the
obligations MJTM agreed to assume substituted MJTM for Sieg as the obligor on those
obligations. But the record does reflect that, to implement the Operating Agreement,
effectively simultaneously with Sieg's conveyance of the Property to MJTM, MJTM
acquired a $1,413 million loan from Zions First National Bank, $300,000 of which was
used to pay off the $300,000 loan in Sieg's name secured by a lien on the Property. It is
true that, as a condition to making the $1.413 million loan to MJTM, Zions First National
Bank required a guaranty agreement from Sieg as well as from Vaughn, Johnson and
Davis.

Nonetheless, MJTM was primarily liable on the loan, and the members'

guaranties involved only secondary liability. But for the MJTM Operating Agreement,

Sieg was not otherwise entitled to have MJTM pay off the $300,000 in liabilities, and that
payment constituted consideration for Sieg's transfer of the Property to MJTM.
As a matter of law, the benefits Sieg received from MJTM that he was not
otherwise entitled to, including particularly MJTM's payment of the $300,000 loan in
Sieg's name secured by a lien on the Property, constituted valid consideration.
With regard to the interest Sieg received in MJTM and the agreed preferential
return, Sieg argued below and on appeal in the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Motion for Summary Affirmance (the "Affirmance Memo") that, because the
consideration given to Sieg by MJTM would have only been valuable to Sieg if MJTM
were profitable (according to Sieg's argument) and MJTM did not "promise" to be
profitable or guarantee profitability, there was no consideration for Sieg's transfer of the
Property to MJTM. See, e.g., Affirmance Memo at 6-8. Sieg's analysis of lack of
consideration is totally misplaced for numerous reasons.
First, Sieg is wrong in his assertion that his conveyance of the Property to MJTM
lacked consideration because MJTM did not promise to be profitable. In fact, MJTM
made an implied promise to use reasonable efforts to attain profitability, insofar as such
an implied promise is necessary for the contract to be enforceable (as discussed below,
Sieg's conveyance of the Property to MJTM was supported by consideration without
imposing any implied promise of profitability in the MJTM Operating Agreement). This
concept was first firmly established in the United States in the seminal case of Wood v.
Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 90-91, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917).

In the Wood case, a designer entered into a contract with a marketer who was to
have the exclusive right, subject to the designer's approval, to place the designer's
endorsement on designs of others, and the marketer was to have the exclusive right to sell
or license the designer's designs. In exchange, the designer was to receive one-half of all
profits and revenues derived from contracts the marketer might make. In defense of an
action by the marketer for the designer's breach of the agreement by placing her
endorsement on designs without the marketer's knowledge, the designer argued that the
contract failed for lack of consideration (also referred to as lack of mutuality of
consideration or illusory consideration) because the marketer did not bind himself to
anything, in effect arguing that the marketer did not promise or guarantee effort that
would lead to profitability. The court rejected that argument, stating:
It is true that [the marketer] does not promise in so many
words that he will use reasonable efforts to place the
defendant's indorsements [sic] and market her designs. We
think, however, that such a promise is fairly to be implied.
The law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when
the precise word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip
was fatal.
Id.
In a more recent and analogous case, the court considered the argument that a
partnership agreement was not enforceable because there was no promise or guarantee
that the partnership would be profitable. In Non-Linear Trading Co. v. Braddis Assocs.,
243 A.D.2d 107, 675 N.Y.S.2d 5 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998), the plaintiff made a capital
contribution in cash to a partnership with the intent that the partnership would develop a
marketable product. Under the terms of the partnership agreement, returns to the plaintiff

would only come after $400,000 of net operating profits were first used by the
partnership to fund additional research. The trial court dismissed a claim for breach of
the partnership agreement because the court concluded that the partnership agreement
was unenforceable. Although the appellate court concluded that there was no breach of
the partnership agreement, the appellate court disagreed that the partnership agreement
was unenforceable. The Non-Linear Trading court stated "[i]t is settled that a party's
promise to use best efforts to accomplish the purpose of an agreement is valid
consideration that will be implied, if necessary, to avoid failure of the contract for lack of
mutuality, especially where the parties have indicated the intent to be contractually bound
...." Id. at 114, 675N.Y.S.2datlO.
As explained by a leading contracts treatise:
The tendency of the law is to avoid the finding that no
contract arose due to an illusory promise when it appears that
the parties intended a contract. ... Frequently a court will
find an apparently illusory promise to be accompanied by an
implied promise to use "best efforts" or "reasonable efforts."
... An implied obligation to use good faith is enough to avoid
the finding of an illusory promise.
2 Joseph M. Perillo & Helen H. Bender, Corbin on Contracts § 5.28, at 149-50 (rev. ed.
1995). Of course, under Utah law, "every contract is subject to an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing ...." Malibu Inv. Co. v. Sparks, 2000 UT 30, ^ 19, 996 P.2d
1043.
While no promise will be implied which contradicts or adds to a specific express
promise in the agreement, Woodland Theatres, Inc. v. ABC Intermountain Theatres, Inc.,
560 P.2d 700, 703 (Utah 1977), MJTM's implied promise to use reasonable efforts to
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II.

SIEG'S CONVEYANCE OF THE PROPERTY TO MJTM, A LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANY, WAS A "SALE" OR "EXCHANGE" UNDER
THE EXCLUSIVE LISTING AGREEMENT.
There are various cases that address the effect on an exclusive listing agreement or

similar arrangement of a conveyance of the subject property to a partnership or joint
venture of which the owner is a partner, with varying results. See, ej*., Salt Lake Knee &
Sports Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Knee & Sports Medicine, 909 P.2d 266, 26970 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (transfer was a sale), cert, denied, 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996);
Cooley Inv. Co. v. Jones, 780 P.2d 29, 31 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (transfer not a sale or
exchange); Miller, Cowherd & Kerver, Inc. v. De Montejo, 406 So.2d 1196, 1197-98
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (transfer not a sale); Dahdah v. Continent Realty, Inc., 434
So.2d 997, 998-99 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (agreement to jointly develop property not a
sale or exchange). None of these cases addresses the effect on an exclusive listing
agreement or similar arrangement of a transfer of property from an individual to a limited
liability company of which the individual is a member. In fact, the cited cases outside of
Utah were decided before a limited liability company was established as a legal entity by
the Utah legislature in 1991.
In Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Knee & Sports
Medicine, 909 P.2d 266 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), cert, denied, 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996),2
this Court considered whether a transfer of property from a partnership to a new joint
venture constituted a "sale," triggering liability to a third party.
2

In that case, a

A copy of the Salt Lake Knee case is included in the Addendum for the Court's
convenience.
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This Court ruled that, because under Utah law a joint venture is a

Termination Agreement. Salt Lake Knee, 909 P.2d at 269.
Although under the common law, a partnership was not considered an entity
distinct fi oi n its partners, Wal 1 Inv. v. Garden Gate Distnb., Inc., 593 P.2< 1 542, 5 14
(Utah 1979), as eai 1> as 1898, the I Itah Supreme Coi it t i ecognized tl lat i n idei the I Itah

partnership statute, a partnership is a separate entity from its partners: "The firm had a
legal existence, and a name by which it was capable of doing business and of being sued,
and to that extent it had, in law, a separate and distinct existence from natural persons. In
law there were four persons; the one was artificial, and with a more limited capacity."
Hamner v. B.K. Bloch & Co., 52 P. 770, 771 (Utah 1898). The Utah Supreme Court has
since reiterated that a partnership is a separate legal entity from its partners. Wall Inv.,
593 P.2d at 544; Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499, 500-01 (Utah 1988).
The entity to which Sieg conveyed the Property in this case was a limited liability
company, not a partnership. Like a corporation or limited partnership, a limited liability
company is entirely a creature of statute. See Wall Inv., 593 P.2d at 544. By statute in
Utah, a limited liability company is a separate legal entity from its members under the
Utah Limited Liability Company Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2b-105(l), -109(1),
-112 & -127(1) (1998 & Supp. 2000).
The one case, discussed above, addressing the obligation of an owner of property
subject to an exclusive listing to pay a brokerage fee upon conveying the property to a
limited liability company of which the owner is a member found that the transfer to the
limited liability company constituted a sale entitling the real estate broker to receive the
brokerage fee agreed to in the listing agreement. Hagan, 253 Va. 217, 220, 482 S.E.2d
805, 807 (Va. 1997). The Hagan court concluded that a limited liability company is an
entity separate from its members under Virginia law, and thus the transfer of property to
the limited liability company was a transfer from one entity or person to another. Id. at
220, 482 S.E.2d at 807. Based on the court's conclusion that the conveyance was
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Sieg conveyed the Property to MJTM without Premier's knowledge or input
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to MJTM, he received valid consideration to support the enforceability of the applicable
provisions of the Operating Agreement, MJTM operated pursuant to the Operating
Agreement for over one year and Sieg ultimately bought out the other members in MJTM
with the assistance of Karl Malone, dissolved MJTM and sold a percentage interest in the
Property to Malone. Whether or not MJTM worked out exactly as anticipated by Sieg,
Premier is entitled to its commission given that Sieg conveyed the Property to MJTM
during the term of Premier's exclusive listing agreement for an agreed value of $1.3
million and received valid consideration.
This Court should reverse the ruling of the district court, and remand with
instructions to the district court to enter judgment in favor of Premier.
IV.

THE COURT SHOULD REMAND WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO ENTER
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PREMIER IN THE AMOUNT OF $91,250,
BASED ON THE AGREED VALUE FOR MJTM'S ACQUISITION OF THE
PROPERTY IN THE OPERATING AGREEMENT.
The Listing provided:
If, during the Listing Period, Coldwell Banker Premier
Realty, the Listing Agent, the Owner, another real estate
agent, or anyone else locates a party who is ready, willing and
able to buy, lease, or exchange (collectively referred to as
"acquire") the Property, or any part thereof, at the listing
price and terms stated on the attached board/association
property data information form, or any other price or terms to
which the Owner may agree in writing, the Owner agrees to
pay to Coldwell Banker Premier Realty a brokerage fee in the
amount of seven percent (7%) of such acquisition price; in
addition, there will be a two hundred fifty dollar ($250.00)
charge at the time of closing.
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T H E C O U R T S H O U L D A L S O R E M A N D F O R E N T R Y O F J U D G M E N I IN
F A V O R OF P R E M I E R A W A R D I N G IT P R E J U D G M E N T INTEREST, PLUS
REASONABLE COSTS A N D A T T O R N E Y S ' FEES.
Prejudgn iei it interest i i ia> be awai ded. ii i a case si ic: 1 i a s this x\\ 1 iei e tl le loss is
fixed as of a particular time and the at i IOUI it of tl le loss can be calculated with

mathematical accuracy." Jorgensen v. John Clay and Co., 660 P.2d 229, 233 (Utah
1983); see also Domcoy Investors, 733 P.2d at 129 (trial court granted summary
judgment awarding prejudgment interest in case with similar facts). The amount of the
broker's fee in this case was fixed in the Listing and can be calculated with mathematical
accuracy based on the value of the Property agreed in the Operating Agreement. Further,
Premier's entitlement to the brokerage fee was fixed as of January 21, 1998, when Sieg
conveyed the Property to MJTM, at the latest. Premier is entitled to prejudgment interest
on its broker's fee of $91,250 at the statutory rate of 10% from January 21, 1998 until
judgment is entered. Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2).
Also, in Utah, attorneys' fees can be awarded to the prevailing party if provided
for by contract, by statute, or if the Court, in exercise of its inherent equitable power,
deems it appropriate in the interest of justice and equity to award reasonable attorneys'
fees. Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994). When a
contract provides for an award of attorneys' fees, they are awarded as a matter of legal
right. Cabrera v. Cotrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985).
The Listing provides, "in case of the employment of an attorney in any matter
arising out of this Listing Agreement (including a sale of the Property) the prevailing
party shall be entitled to receive from the other party all costs and reasonable attorney's
fees, whether the matter is resolved through court action or otherwise." R. at 110, ^ 8.
As the appropriately prevailing party, Premier is contractually entitled to receive an
award of its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, and Sieg is not entitled to recover either
his fees or costs.
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attorney, the number of hours spent to prosecute the claim to judgment, or the time spent

in pursuing the matter to the stage for which attorney fees are claimed, and affirm the
reasonableness of the fees for comparable legal services."
Sieg failed to present the required evidence to establish the reasonableness of the
requested attorneys' fees. In the Affidavit for Attorney Fees submitted by Sieg, counsel
merely stated that he performed 37.6 hours of attorney time at the rate of $150.00 per
hour and that an associate performed 160.3 hours of work at a rate of $90.00 per hour. R.
at 338. Sieg failed to satisfy the dictate of Rule 4-505(1) that the affidavit set forth
specifically (1) the legal basis for the award, (2) the nature of the work performed, and
(3) the number of hours spent. Counsel does not even attempt to describe the actual work
performed, nor the amount of time spent on any task, in order that the trial court could
have assessed the reasonableness of the requested fees. See R. at 337-39. Without this
evidence, the trial court could not "assess the reasonableness of the number of hours
spent on the case or the fee customarily charged in the area for similar services. Nor
could the court assess the efficiency of the attorneys who worked on the litigation."
Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269 (Utah 1992). Counsel's conclusory assertion
in the affidavit that the "charge and the work performed in this matter is reasonable and
in keeping with rates normally charged in the State of Utah for actions of this type" did
not satisfy Sieg's burden nor allow the trial court to make its required assessment. See R.
at 337-38.
Also, a party seeking attorneys' fees must "distinguish between work done that was
subject to a fee award and work that was not." Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d at 269.
Without any description of the work performed, the trial court was unable to assess whether the

work pet foi n iecl was all appi o{ :»i iately con ipei isable, as i eqi lii ed t u idei 1 Itah law Id.

:

' ' it! 101 it the

supporting evidence which I Itah law requires the trial court to review in detei n lining the
reasoiiatilciicss of i equested atton \cy s' fees ai id costs, the trial court abused :is di-cretior in
awarding Sieg the requested but unsupported attorneys' fees and costs.
CONCLUSION
I he district coin t's ( h tnbt i 0, MMHl U r d u , .is . . u p p l u n r n l n l l> ml . I Vi embi
2000 Minute Entry should be reversed. 1 Ins Court should remand the ease to the district
court ".'!.., u.sti.i. .i >nc- to e~ f rr judgment in *hvr-r ~r !V*miu ,ii>M -Niin-- Sieg for
i

\-. • • • • - • •

^

< 'V

i; ..

judgment i«

entered, plus Premier's reasonable costs and attorneys' fees both m IIK d; ;:- on appeal, in an amount to be determined b y the district court.
mi h\ I Id ) iht> / /

oa> in ^epteiiioti, zuOl.
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
1 If til ( m l i

\iiii

i} 4N-.!I>-1 ()''.< I ) :

( , ; - .. .. liimi'- 1 liability coi i ipai ly orgat lized ai id existing
under this chapu,: a u } .
(a) sue or be sued, or institute or di'icud anv action
arbitration, or proceeding, whether judiciii* -immisfrative. or
otherwise, in its own name;
(b) purchase, take, iccci\c, !iasi\ or otherwise acquire, own,,
5
hold, improve, u^c o? otherwise dra! ;
with real or
1
/:
personal properh or ,in a n - - - m ?« •••• personal property,
wherever situate-!
(e) seli come) nortgage, pledge, create a security interest
in. L-ase. exchange oi han-X» 01 ^IIKTWINO dispose of jl
MI> r-M'i of" its property or assets;
{dj »u»d ^HMH^
managers;

Lo

and otherwise assist its ei i iplo] ' ees ai id

(e) purchase, take, receive, subscribe MM. ~~ otherwise
acquire, own, hold, vote, use, employ, sell, mortgage, lend,
pledge, otherwise dispose of, or otherwise use or deal in or
with:
(i) shares or other interests in or obligations of other foreign
or domestic limited liability companies, domestic or foreign
corporations, associations, general or limited partnerships, or
individuals; or
(ii) direct or indirect obligations of the United States or any
other government, state, territory, governmental district, or
municipality or of anv instrumentality of thenr
(1) m;ik.e contracts or guarantees o\ \i\,in liabilities, borrow
money ai such \AW< of \uw\\^\ as the limited nubility
company may determine, issue ih *.-»ies hoiuK o; other
obligations, or secure am n»' IN obligations **\ mortgage or

pledge of all or any part of its property, franchises, and
income;
(g) lend money for any lawful purpose, invest or reinvest its
funds, or take and hold real or personal property as security
for the payment of funds so loaned or invested;
(h) conduct its business and maintain offices and exercise the
powers granted by this chapter within or without this state, in
any state, territory, district, or possession of the United States
or in any foreign country;
(i) elect or appoint managers and agents of the limited
liability company, define their duties, and fix their
compensation;
(j) make and alter an operating agreement, not inconsistent
with its articles of organization or with the laws of this state,
for the administration and regulation of its affairs;
(k) make donations for the public welfare or for charitable,
scientific, religious, or educational purposes;
(1) indemnify a member or manager or any other person to the
same extent that a partnership may indemnify any of the
partners, managers, employees, or agents of the partnership
against expenses actually and reasonably incurred by the
member or manager in connection with the defense of an
action, suit, or proceeding, whether civil or criminal, in which
the member or manager is made a party;
(m) cease its activities and surrender its certificate of
organization;
(n) have and exercise all powers necessary or convenient to
effect any or all of the purposes for which the company is
organized;
(o) transact any lawful business which the members or the
managers find to be in aid of governmental policy;
(p) pay pensions and establish pension plans, profit-sharing
plans, and other incentive plans for any or all of its managers
and employees;

-A-2-

(q) be a promoter, incorporaior, genual partnet, limited
partner, member, associate, -• manager of any corporation,
partnership, limited partnership, limited liability company,
joint ventmv. !:n-,t m other enterprise; and
(r) rendei piofessional services, if each nlember 01 A UHHU :
liability company who renders professional services in I'tali
is licensed or registered to render those professional services
pursuant to applicable Utah b w
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482 S.E.2d 805
(Cite as: 253 Va. 217, 482 S.E.2d 805)
Supreme Court of Virginia.
Maureen K. HAGAN, et al.
v.
ADAMS PROPERTY ASSOCIATES, INC.

he was a member constituted a sale, thus entitling real estate broker to
commission authorized by listing agreement between owner and broker.
Code 1950, §§ 13.1-1002 to 13.1-1073.
[3] Brokers <§=*69
65k69

Record No. 961332.
Feb. 28, 1997.
Real estate broker sought recovery of commission after owner transferred
apartments to limited liability company of which owner was a member.
The Circuit Court, City of Richmond, Theodore J. Markow, J., ruled that
broker was entitled to commission.
Owner appealed.
The Supreme
Court, Lacy, J., held that: (1) transfer of apartments was a sale, and (2)
gross sales amount was sum of debt relief that owner received from
company plus amount of deed of trust note that owner received from
company.
Affirmed.

For purpose of determining real estate broker's commission, gross sales
amount of transfer of apartments from owner to limited liability company
in which owner was a member was sum of debt relief owner received from
company plus amount of deed of trust note that owner received from
company, even though deed of trust note was not due until property was
sold and was subordinate to first deed of trust note and future development
loans.
**806 *218 Joseph W. Kaestner, Richmond (Patricia A. Phillips;
Kaestner & Pitney, on brief), for appellants.
Alexander N. Simon, Richmond, for appellee.
Present: CARRICO, C.J., COMPTON, LACY, HASSELL, KEENAN
and KOONTZ, JJ., and WHITING, Senior Justice.

West Headnotes
LACY, Justice.
[1] Brokers <§=>39
65k39
Apartment owner received valid consideration for his transfer of
apartments to limited liability company of which he was a member, for
purpose of determining whether transfer was a sale and thus entitled real
estate broker to commission; company agreed to assume all liabilities
existing on property, company became liable to owner for any amount
owner would have to pay holder of deed note, and company executed
second deed of trust on property securing note payable to owner.
[2] Brokers <§^39
65k39
Transfer of apartments from owner to limited liability company of which

In this appeal, we consider whether a transfer of real property from its
owner to a limited liability company in which the owner is a member
constitutes the sale of the property, entitling a real estate broker to a
commission authorized by a listing agreement between the owner and
broker.
Ralph E. and Maureen K. Hagan (collectively "Hagan") owned the Stuart
Court Apartments (the property) in Richmond. On April 30, 1994, Hagan
executed an agreement with Adams Property Associates, Inc. (Adams),
giving Adams the exclusive right to sell the property for $1,600,000. The
agreement provided that if the property was "sold or exchanged" within
one year, with or without Adams' assistance, Hagan would pay Adams a
fee of six percent of the "gross sales amount." Before the year expired,
Hagan, Roy T. Tepper, *219 and Lynn Parsons formed a limited liability
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company, Hagan, Parsons, & Tepper, L.L.C. (HPT). By deed dated April
23, 1995, Hagan transferred the property to HPT.
Adams filed a motion for judgment seeking recovery of a commission
from Hagan pursuant to the April 1994 agreement. The trial court held
that Adams was entitled to a commission because the transfer of the
property to HPT constituted a sale of the property. Hagan appealed both
the determination that a sale of the property occurred and the amount of the
commission awarded.
[1] Hagan first contends that transfer of legal title to the property to HPT
represented his contribution to the capitalization of a new company, and
capitalization of a new venture should not be classified as the sale of
property, citing Southpace Properties, Inc. v. Acquisition Group, 5 F.3d
500, 504 (11th Cir.1993); Cooley Investment Co. v. Jones, 780 P.2d 29,
31 (Colo. App. 1989); Miller, Cowherd & Kerver, Inc. v. De Montejo, 406
So.2d 1196, 1198 (Fla.App. 1981); and McElhinney **807 v. Belsky, 165
Pa.Super. 546, 69 A.2d 178, 181 (1949). Hagan also asserts that the
transfer did not constitute a sale because he did not receive any present
valuable consideration for his contribution. Hagan contends that, while his
contribution determined what share of the ownership of the company he
was entitled to receive, a new business such as HPT "involves an
expectation of future profits and is always speculative." We disagree.
When Hagan transferred the property to HPT, he received more than an
interest in the new company. Under the terms of the operating agreement
executed in conjunction with the formation of HPT, HPT agreed to assume
all liabilities existing on the property, which included the $1,028,000
unpaid balance on a first deed of trust note on the property. The record
does not indicate whether the holder of the first deed of trust note released
Hagan and substituted HPT as the obligor on the note. Even assuming
such substitution did not occur, Hagan nevertheless received substantial
relief from his debt obligation because, upon assuming all liabilities on the
property, HPT became liable to Hagan for any amount Hagan would have
had to pay the holder of the first deed of trust note. Also as part of the
property transfer transaction, HPT executed a second deed of trust on the
property securing a note payable to Hagan for $323,000. This note was
due and payable when the property was subsequently sold, and it had
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priority over payments to anyone other than the beneficiary of the first
deed of trust.
Thus, in exchange for transfer of title to the property,
Hagan received relief from his debt on the first deed *220 of trust note as
well as the benefit of a second deed of trust note and an interest in HPT.
These benefits received by Hagan constituted valid consideration. Brewer
v. Bank of Danville, 202 Va. 807, 815, 120 S.E.2d 273, 279 (1961).
[2] Furthermore, the cases relied on by Hagan for the proposition that the
contribution of property to a limited liability company is not a sale but the
capitalization of a new company are inapposite. Those cases involved the
capitalization of a partnership or entity governed by partnership law. As
noted in those cases, a partnership is not an entity separate from the
partners themselves; thus, in such circumstances, there is no transfer of
property from one person to another, but only a change in the form of
ownership. Southpace, 5 F.3d at 504; Cooley, 780 P.2d at 31; De
Montejo, 406 So,2d at 1198; McElhinney, 69 A.2d at 181. In this case,
however, the new venture was a limited liability company, not a
partnership.
Under the Virginia Limited Liability Company Act, Code §§ 13,1-1002
through 13.1-1073, a limited liability company is an unincorporated
association with a registered agent and office. §§ 13.1-1002, -1015. It is
an independent entity which can sue and be sued and its members are not
personally liable for the debt or actions of the company. §§
13.1-1009,-1019. In contrast to a partnership, a limited liability company
in Virginia is an entity separate from its members and, thus, the transfer of
property from a member to the limited liability company is more than a
change in the form of ownership; it is a transfer from one entity or person
to another. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that
Hagan transferred the title of the property in exchange for valuable
consideration and that this transfer was a sale of the property.
[3] Hagan also complains that in calculating the commission due Adams,
the trial court used the wrong components to determine the gross sales
•mount. The trial court calculated the gross sales amount to be the sum of
debt relief Hagan received from HPT, $1,028,000, plus the amount of the
•cond deed of trust note which Hagan received from HPT, $323,000.
:
N1] Hagan first asserts that the gross sales amount should be the fair
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market value of the debt, which is $775,000, the amount Tepper and
Parsons paid for the first deed of trust note when they purchased it in June,
1995. We disagree.
FN1. The parties agree that an arithmetic error occurred in the trial court's
calculation of the commission and that the proper figures under the court's
finding are a gross sales amount of $1,351,000 which results in a six percent
commission of $81,060.
*221 The status of Hagan's indebtedness was altered when he transferred
the property to **808 HPT under the terms of the operating agreement, not
when Tepper and Parsons individually purchased the first deed of trust
note. The gross sales amount is the consideration which Hagan received
from HPT, not an amount agreed upon between some other buyer and
seller at another time. [FN2]
FN2. Hagan also argues that his debt relief was only the difference between
the original amount of the note, $1,028,000, and the $775,000 purchase price
of the note. This position is based on Hagan's contention that he had
continuing liability for the first deed of trust note, a contention we addressed,
supra.
Finally, Hagan asserts that the second deed of trust note should not have
been included as part of the gross sales amount because it was not due until
the property was sold and was subordinate to the first deed of trust note

and future development loans. Under these circumstances, Hagan claims,
the second deed of trust note had no present value. Again we disagree.
Whether the second deed of trust note would ultimately result in a payment
of $323,000 to Hagan is not relevant to the measure of the value ascribed
to the transaction by the parties at the time of the transaction. There is
nothing speculative about a second deed of trust note in the amount of
$323,000.
It was part of the agreement surrounding the transfer of
ownership of the property and represented a portion of the amount Hagan
was willing to accept for the property.
Thus, the trial court properly
considered the second deed of trust note as consideration received by
Hagan for the sale of the property and properly included it as part of the
gross sales amount for purposes of calculating the amount of commission
due Adams.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court holding that
Hagan's transfer of title to the property to HPT was a sale of the property,
that Adams was entitled to a commission on the gross sales amount, and
that the gross sales amount is the debt relief plus the second deed of trust
note Hagan received, $1,028,000 and $323,000, respectively, resulting in a
commission of $81,060.
Affirmed.
END OF DOCUMENT
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1. Appeal and Error ©=*934(1)
In determining propriety of grant of
summary judgment, facts are viewed in light
most favorable to position of losing party.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c), 28 U.S.C.A.

upon subsequent sale of business, where defendant partnership was paid for one half of
assets and received one half interest in new
joint venture which assumed complete management control of business.

2. Appeal and Error <&»842(2)

ALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS REHABILITATION, INC., fka Professional
Therapy, Inc., Plaintiff and Appellant,

ILT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS
MEDICINE, a Utah general partnership;
Lonnie E. Paulos, M.D., P.C., a Utah
professional corporation; and Thomas
D. Rosenberg, M.D., P.C., a Utah professional corporation, general partners, Defendants and Appellees.
No. 940417-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Dec. 21, 1995.

Trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness.

John C. Green and Kim M. Luhn, Salt
Lake City, for Appellant.

3. Motions @=>39

Mark 0 . Morris and Jeffrey T. Sivertsen,
Salt Lake City, for Appellees.

Rules of civil procedure do not provide
for "motion for reconsideration" of trial
court's ruling; however, motions so entitled
could be considered if they could have properly been brought under some rule and were
merely incorrectly titled.
4. Appeal and Error <®=*345.1
New Trial ^124(1)
Although plaintiff in breach of contract
action improperly entitled motion as "motion
for reconsideration," after adverse decision
on summary judgment, motion was in essence motion for new trial, and therefore
filing motion tolled period for filing appeal;
trial judge ruled on the motion as if it were
motion for new trial. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule
59(a).
5. Joint Adventures @=>1.1

Physical therapy corporation brought acac _
fSi_
n against defendant partnership of physi}ue
ns for failure to pay amounts allegedly due
>n subsequent "sale" of sports medicine
dness, as provided for in agreement termiing professional services contract. The
fte
rd District Court, Salt Lake County, HoI0_
r F. Wilkinson, J., granted summary judg\g_
it for defendant, and denied plaintiffs
ffs
)tion to reconsider." Plaintiff appealed.
ed.
J Court of Appeals, Davis, Associate P. jJ.,
#>
1 that: (1) plaintiffs substantive motion
on
new trial tolled period for filing appeal;
alj
new joint venture which acquired busisi.
5 was "third party" for purposes of agreecea
it; and (3) defendant obtained considerrn for sale of business' assets.
Reversed and remanded.
Bench, J., concurred and dissented, and
rid
opinion.

Like partnerships, joint ventures are
distinct and separate legal entities. U.C.A.
1953, 48-1-3.1(1, 2).
6. Contracts <®=>202(1)
Even though defendant partnership was
member of new joint venture, new joint venture was separate legal entity and as such
was "third party" for purposes of defendant
partnership's obligation to pay upon subsequent sale of sports medicine business to
"third party," under agreement terminating
Pprofessional services contract between plaintiff physical therapy corporation and defenclant partnership of physicians.
7.
7. Contracts
Contracts @=>202(1)
@=>202(1)
Defendant partnership of physicians received consideration for sale of assets of
sports medicine business, for purposes of
obligation to pay former business associate

Before DAVIS, BENCH and BILLINGS,
JJ.
DAVIS, Associate Presiding Judge:
Appellant, Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehabilitation, Inc. (Rehabilitation) challenges
the trial court's order granting summary
judgment to appellees, Salt Lake City Knee
& Sports Medicine (Physicians), a general
partnership; and its general partners, Lonnie E. Paulos, M.D., P.C., a Utah professional corporation (Paulos); and Thomas D.
Rosenberg, M.D., P.C., a Utah professional
corporation (Rosenberg). We reverse and
remand.
FACTS
Rehabilitation and Physicians formerly
worked together providing medical and physical therapy services at the Salt Lake Sports
Medicine Center (Center) located at 670 East
3900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, under the
terms of a professional services agreement.
On May 22, 1989, these parties entered into a
termination agreement and purchase agreement (Agreement) which terminated the parties' professional services contract. Paragraph eleven of this Agreement stated:
Purchase of Center. It is agreed that if
within two (2) years from the date of this
Agreement, Physicians sells the Center to
any third party, Rehabilitation shall be
entitled to one-third (%) of that portion of
the purchase price which is attributed to
good will. 'Sale' shall be defined as a
transfer wherein the purchaser acquires
and pays consideration for all of the following: The Center's lease on the Leased
Premises, ownership of the name 'Salt
Lake Sports Medicine Center,' all of the

equipment and other assets located at the
Center, the Center's patients and accounts
receivable, and whereby the purchaser assumes complete operational control of the
business of the Center and continues operating under the same name at the same
location.
On May 24, 1990, Physicians entered into
an asset purchase agreement with IHC Hospitals (IHC) pursuant to which Physicians
sold IHC an undivided one-half interest in
the Center. Physicians and IHC then
formed a joint venture called "Sports Medicine West" and transferred their respective
one-half interests thereto.
The joint venture continued to do business
at the Center's location and it temporarily
retained Physicians as its agent to manage
and operate the business. At some point in
time, Sports Medicine West changed the
Center's name from "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" to "Sports Medicine West."
The parties dispute precisely when Sports
Medicine West changed the Center's name,
however it is undisputed that the name was
not changed until at least one year before the
action in this case was filed, approximately
October 1990.
On October 4, 1991, Rehabilitation filed a
complaint for declaratory relief, alleging that
the transactions between IHC and Physicians constituted a "sale" under paragraph
eleven of the Agreement. Physicians filed a
motion for summary judgment on June 15,
1993, and Rehabilitation filed a counter-motion for summary judgment shortly thereafter.
After hearing oral argument on the motions, the trial court permitted further briefing on the parties' interpretations of the
meaning of "sale" as defined by the Agreement. On November 15, 1993, the court
heard additional oral argument on the subject and ruled that to constitute a sale, the
transaction "must include all of the following
. . . items [from paragraph eleven]. And
from those items, it must . . . [include] all of
the equipment and assets, and they [the purchaser] must have complete operational control." The court ruled that the transfer of
one-half of the interest in the Center to IHC

not a sale and rejected Rehabilitation's
ment that the transfer of all assets to
joint venture was a "sale." Therefore,
court granted summary judgment in faof Physicians on November 15, 1993.
shabilitation filed a "motion for reeonsidion" of the trial court's ruling on Novem29, 1993. The trial court heard the
on on January 28, 1994, and again ruled
avor of Physicians. An order to this
it was entered on March 14, 1994. On
11 11, 1994, Rehabilitation filed this ap-

UES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
,2] There are essentially two issues
rented on appeal. The first issue conis the timeliness of Rehabilitation's ap, "[I]t is axiomatic in this jurisdiction
failure to timely perfect an appeal is a
sdictional failure requiring dismissal of
appeal." Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain
I Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah
1). The second issue presented is whethhe trial court erred in granting summary
rment to Physicians based upon its conion that the transaction between IHC
Physicians was not a "sale" within the
ining of paragraph eleven of the Agreelt. Summary judgment is appropriate in
ise where the pleadings, depositions, anrs to interrogatories, and admissions on
together with any affidavits, show there
o genuine issue of material fact and that
moving party is entitled to judgment as a
teroflaw. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); Warburv. Virginia Beach Fed Sav. & Loan
% 899 P.2d 779, 781 (Utah App.1995). In
srmiriing the propriety of a grant of sum-y judgment, we view the facts in the light
>t favorable to the position of the losing
ty. Warburton, 899 P.2d at 781. We
iew the trial court's legal conclusions for
rectness. Id.
ANALYSIS
1. Timeliness of the Appeal
3] Physicians argues that Rehabilitate motion for reconsideration did not toll
We have considered Physicians's other argutents on this issue, including the contentions
tat Rehabilitation simply filed a motion for clarication and that there is some significance to be
Cached to the timing of the entry of the sum-

the running of the time in which to appeal,
and hence Rehabilitation's appeal was untimely.1 It is by now well established that
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not
provide for a "motion for reconsideration" of
a trial court's ruling. Ron Shepherd Ins.,
Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 653 n. 4 (Utah
1994); accord Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa &
Son, 808 P.2d 1061,1064 (Utah 1991). Nonetheless, we have "reviewed motions so entitled if they could have properly been brought
under some rule and were merely incorrectly
titled." Shields, 882 P.2d at 653 n. 4; see
also Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884
P.2d 1306, 1310 n. 2 (Utah App.1994) (noting
that "the substance, not caption, of a motion
is dispositive in determining the character of
the motion").
[4] In this case, Rehabilitation captioned
its motion as a motion for reconsideration.
However, our review indicates that the substance of the motion was essentially identical
to a motion for new trial under Rule 59(a) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, Rehabilitation argued that the trial
court made several errors of law which are
grounds for relief under Rule 59(a)(7). In
addition, by conducting a hearing and reaffirming its legal conclusions, the trial court
ruled upon the motion as if it were a motion
for a new trial. Therefore, as in Watkiss &
Campbell,
[ujnder the facts of this case, the incorrect
title placed upon the pleading was not a
bar to defendant's case. Indeed, the record reflects that the judge ruled on the
motion as if it were a motion for a new
trial. Because the court treated the motion to reconsider as a motion for a new
trial, we conclude that the filing of the
motion tolled the time in which to file an
appeal.
Id. at 1064-65 (footnotes omitted).
We conclude that Rehabilitation's motion
to reconsider is substantively a motion for a
mary judgment order, and reject them as being
without merit. See State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291,
303 (Utah 1992); State v. Carter, lit P.2d 886,
888-89 (Utah 1989), cert, denied,
U.S.
,
116 S.Ct. 163, 133 L.Ed.2d 105 (1995).

new trial, and as such it tolled the time for
filing an appeal. Rehabilitation's appeal was
thus timely.2
2.

Summary Judgment

The trial court granted Physicians's motion
for summary judgment on the basis that a
"sale" to a "third" party within the meaning
of paragraph eleven of the Agreement had
not occurred. The court stated it was "unpersuaded" by Rehabilitation's argument
that all of the assets were transferred to the
new joint venture, Sports Medicine West.
Thus, the only transfer considered by the
court was the transfer of one-half of the
interest in the Center to IHC. Because a
transfer of less than "all" of the interest in
the Center does not trigger the "sale" definition in paragraph eleven, the court granted
summary judgment to Physicians.
The trial court's rationale for rejecting Rehabilitation's argument that all of the assets
were transferred to the joint venture, Sports
Medicine West, is unclear.
Physicians
claims, however, that because it is a co-owner
of Sports Medicine West, the joint venture
cannot be a "third party" within the meaning
of paragraph eleven. We disagree.
[5] A joint venture is defined as "an association of two or more persons to carry on as
co-owners of a single business enterprise."
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-3.1(1) (1994). Joint
ventures are subject to the same rules as
partnerships. Id. § 48-1-3.1(2); Kemp v.
Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 759 n. 1 (Utah 1984);
Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 218 (Utah App.
1990). Based upon the statutes governing
partnerships, the Utah Supreme Court has
ruled that partnerships are distinct and separate legal entities. See Cottonwood Mall Co.
v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499, 501 (Utah 1988) (noting
several sections of the Uniform Partnership
Act treating partnership as a separate legal
entity); Wall Inv. Co. v. Garden Gate Dis2.

Notwithstanding our conclusion, we are not
approving the use of pleadings identified as
something not provided for in the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Such a practice could seriously
compromise the position of a litigant where a
"motion for reconsideration," for example, was
not substantively a motion enumerated under
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, or where other litigants or third parties
acted or failed to act in reliance only on the

trib., Inc., 593 P.2d 542, 544 (Utah 1979)
(noting partnership is legal entity distinct
from partners). Because these statutes apply equally to joint ventures, it follows that
joint ventures are also distinct and separate
legal entities. See Sine, 767 P.2d at 501
(concluding that joint ventures have capacity
to sue in their own names, relying on authority treating partnerships as distinct entities).
[6] We therefore conclude that, under
Utah law, joint ventures are separate legal
entities. Our conclusion is consistent with
rulings in several other jurisdictions. See
Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. Kandik
Constr., Inc., 795 P.2d 793, 802 (Alaska 1990)
(inferentially holding that joint venture is a
separate legal entity), vacated in part on
other grounds, 823 P.2d 632 (Alaska 1991);
First State Serv. Corp. v. Hector's Concrete
Constr., Inc., 168 Ariz. 442, 814 P.2d 783, 783
(App.1991) (joint venture is a separate legal
entity); C.H. Leavell & Co. v. Tax Comm'n,
450 P.2d 211, 214 (Okla.1968) (same); Lawler
v. Dallas Statler-Hilton Joint Venture, 793
S.W.2d 27, 33 (Tex.Ct.App. 1990) (same).3
But see Lewis v. Gardner Eng'g Corp., 254
Ark. 17, 491 S.W.2d 778, 779 (1973) (joint
venture not a separate legal entity); Elting
Ctr. Corp. v. Diversified Title Corp., 306
So.2d 542, 543 (Fla.Dist.CtApp.1974) (same),
cert, denied, 321 So.2d 554 (Fla.1975). As a
separate legal entity, Sports Medicine West
is a "third party" within the meaning of
paragraph eleven.
[7] In addition, Physicians was paid by
IHC for an undivided one-half interest in its
assets, and it received a one-half interest in
the joint venture for the other one-half of the
assets. Therefore, the paragraph eleven requirement that consideration be paid for the
assets was also satisfied. Sports Medicine
West also has complete operational control of
the Center as evidenced by the terms of the
name of the pleading possibly obtained from a
docket entry.
3. Louisiana has not adopted the Uniform Partnership Act, but also considers joint ventures to
be separate legal entities. West Feliciana Parish
Sch. Bd. v. Gulf States Utils. Co,, 486 So.2d 808,
811 (La.Ct.App. 1986).

Management Agreement stating that Sports
Medicine West had complete "day-to day"
operational control of the rehabilitation business.
Finally, according to the parties, the only
remaining issue is whether the joint venture
continued operating the business under the
name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center."
The trial court did not reach this issue,4
notwithstanding disputed, material facts,
having resolved the matter on the issue of
sale of assets. Because of the existence of
disputed material facts, the issue of whether
the joint venture continued to operate the
business under the same name is remanded
to the trial court for determination.
CONCLUSION
The joint venture Sports Medicine West is
a distinct and separate legal entity from Physicians, and from Paulos and Rosenberg, the
general partners of Physicians. As such, it is
a "third person" within the meaning of paragraph eleven. In addition, consideration was
paid for the assets and Sports Medicine West
assumed full operational control of the Center. Thus, we reverse the trial court's grant
of summary judgment to Physicians based
upon the finding that only one-half of the
assets were transferred to IHC. It appears
that material issues of fact exist regarding
the question of whether Sports Medicine
West continued to operate the Center under
the same name. We therefore remand the
matter for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
BILLINGS, J., concurs.

1041, 1044 (Utah App.) (holding substance of
post-judgment motion controls, not caption),
cert, denied 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). We
have previously held that a motion for a new
trial may properly be filed following entry of
a summary judgment. Moon Lake Elec.
Ass'n, Inc. v. Ultrasystems W. Constrs., Inc.,
767 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah App.1988). Our
rules explicitly provide that "the time for
appeal for all parties shall run from the entry
of the order denying a new trial." Utah
R.App.P. 4(b). The filing of a motion under
Rule 59 therefore tolls the time for filing a
notice of appeal.
On the merits, I disagree with the main
opinion's analysis and result. The contract
between the parties provides that Physicians
will share the sale proceeds attributable to
"good will" only when Physicians sell the
entire Center to a third party. In the transaction involving IHC, Physicians clearly retained an ownership interest in the Center.
The fact that the Center is now operated
as a joint venture does not lead to the result
reached by the main opinion. The joint venture statute provides that the only way Physicians can participate in a joint venture is if
it is a co-owner. See Utah Code Ann. § 481-3.1(1) (1995) ("[a] joint venture is an association of two or more persons to carry on as
co-owners of a single business enterprise.")
(emphasis added). Since Physicians indisputably remains a co-owner of the Center, it
has not sold it as contemplated by paragraph
eleven of the parties' agreement.
I would therefore affirm the summary
judgment.

BENCH, Judge (concurring and
dissenting):
I concur in holding that this appeal was
timely filed. I dissent, however, from the
reversal of the summary judgment.
As to the timeliness of the appeal, I agree
that Rehabilitation's "motion for reconsideration" was essentially a Rule 59 motion for a
new trial. See State v. Parker, 872 P.2d
4. The trial court also did not reach the subsidiary
issue of whether to strike the affidavits submitted
by Rehabilitation. We note however, that even if
the trial court had struck Rehabilitation's affida-

vits, the affidavit submitted by Physicians establishes nonetheless that the name of the business
remained unchanged for several months.

